Creating reality as a locally tailored interface – an integrational, pragmatic account of semiosis by Conrad, Charlotte
12 Charlotte Conrad
Creating reality as a locally tailored interface – 
an integrational, pragmatic account of semiosis
Charlotte Conrad1
Abstract. Linguistics and semiotics traditionally assert the view that communication 
presupposes signs. Integrational linguistics challenges this notion by refuting the first-
order ontological status of signs and semiological codes. Yet if communication does not 
depend on pre-established signs, then how does semiosis proceed? And what is the basis 
for the intuitively acceptable notion that codes do exist as socially carried structures 
among living beings? In this article I present an integrational account of semiosis 
based on the suggestion that sign-making is a perceptual activity. I draw on William 
James’ concept of human experience to expound Roy Harris’ claims for the radical 
indeterminacy of the sign, for contextualization, and for the process of integration. 
In closing, I consider the role that mental associations, for example, those between 
language sounds and concepts, play in communicative activity.
Keywords: semiosis; integrationism; pragmatism; perception; contextualization; radical 
indeterminacy of the sign
1. Introduction
Roy Harris is best known for his provocative and well-argued revolt (for an 
analysis, see Cobley 2011) against the traditional linguistic idea that a ‘language’ is 
an ontologically independent semiological structure that governs the actual acts 
of communication in a linguistic community (Harris 1981, 1996a, 1998). While 
Harris’ argument carries the most direct impact to the scientific foundation of 
linguistics, the claims he makes clearly have consequences beyond the language 
sciences. 
 All signs, says Harris, granted that we understand them as semiologically 
active phenomena, exist only in the individual sign-maker’s consciousness during 
the fleeting moment of sign-making. And here, they are made in contextually 
contingent ways which render them radically indeterminate to any other than the 
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first-person perspective. Harris further claims that “there is no single all-purpose 
conception of the sign that fits all intellectual enterprises” (Harris 2009: 61). By 
these claims, integrationist semiology obviously challenges the soundness of all 
discussions that grant signs ontological autonomy and permanent, context-free 
identity – as does, for example, most of the research that has established semiotics 
as a successful research field since the mid-20th century. It is not clear, however, 
what exact consequences integrationism carries to semiotic inquiry. Integrationist 
theory is still evolving, and so far it has taken away the notion of pre-existing 
signs without presenting an account of semiosis detailed enough to explain how 
people are able to communicate successfully, and in ways that yield to the fallacy 
of thinking that culturally shared semiological codes do exist.
 In this article I present an integrational account of semiosis that does not 
presuppose signs, but explains them as emergent within human perceptual 
activity. The account is delivered by expounding Harris’ claims for the radical 
indeterminacy of the sign, for contextualization, and for the process of integration. 
It also mentions the role that mental associations, between language sounds and 
concepts, for example, play in communicative activity.
 The account is rooted in pragmatic ideas on how we perceive the world. I 
suggest that the American pragmatists presented an understanding of human 
experience that allows us to understand the inner dynamics of human semiosis 
when it is seen as the creation of radically indeterminate signs. In the writings 
of William James this understanding is expressed in sufficient detail to inspire a 
fundamental account of integrational semiosis.
2. The radical indeterminacy of the sign
A central tenet of integrationism is that the signs human beings make are radically 
indeterminate. Neither their form nor meaning can be realized from a perspective 
outside the sign-makers perspective in the local moment of sign-making. The 
fundamental integrationist premise for claiming indeterminacy is Harris’ realiza-
tion that acts of communication are ontologically prior to the creation of signs. 
Communication processes do not wait for a set of fixed signs to be available, signs 
are created in and by the act of communication: 
Integrational semiology starts from the premise that signs occur in and as the 
products of communication processes. Given that no communication is contextless 
and that all communication is uniquely contextualized (the participants being 
time-bound agents), it follows that signs also are unique. (Harris 1996a: 154)
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In Harrisian semiology the sign-maker’s perception of context is thus a determi-
native factor in the sign-making act. What I am going to suggest in the following 
is that human perceptual ability can account even more fully for sign-making 
without claiming a predefined sign – granted the employment of an appropriate 
understanding of perception. 
 The human faculty for perception, seen as “the process whereby sensory 
stimulation is translated into organized experience”2, has historically been subject 
to much debate in Western philosophy and psychology. A consensus around 
perceptual realism has historically been dominant, but today some form or degree 
of relativism in human perception is generally recognized across academia – we 
see it serving as an important tenet in the established epistemology of the natural 
sciences (i.e. in the critical rationalism of Karl Popper) and find it explored in the 
current enactivist wave in cognition studies which talks of reality as completely 
relative to – enacted by – the individual perceiving and interacting individual (e.g. 
Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991; Noë 2004).
 In this light, one might not expect current semiological theory to incorporate 
ideas of an autonomous reality being diaphanously perceived. Yet proposing signs 
to be stable prerequisites for communication – as the thinking in “semiological 
codes” presented in mainstream linguistics, semiotics and biosemiotics does – 
depends at least on the notion that pre-established expressive forms have inde -
pendent and objective existence and somehow wander unhindered and un-
com promised into the individual sign-making mind on each occasion of com-
prehension. 
 Arguably, mainstream Western thoughts on language, knowledge, ontology 
and perception hold one another in a mutually restrictive pattern orchestrated by 
an incredibly consequential interest in attaining absolute knowledge of external 
reality.3 Integrationism, by claiming radical indeterminacy of signs, breaks free 
from this thought pattern, and accordingly I suggest that traditional perceptual 
theory will not be able to sustain it. In the interest of arguing for my choice of an 
alternative concept of perception to sustain integrational semiology, I will refer to 
the historical development of thoughts on perception in what follows. 
 When Aristotle portrayed language in his Poetics, he cast it as a fixed code 
for the immaculate transfer of thoughts based on the philosophical idea that all 
men carry in their minds the same impressions of worldly things tied to the same 
language sounds (Harris 1981). To Aristotle man was not the true epistemic agent 
2 Dember, William N.; Epstein, William; West, Louis J. Perception. Encyclopedia Britan nica. 
(https://www.britannica.com/topic/perception) was accessed in August 2019.
3 For a thorough exploration of the interdependency of the Western concepts of language 
and philosophy, please see Harris 1996b.
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per se: divine ratio operated through him, grasping or rather, adapting its shape 
to, the eternal form, the essence or organizing principle (logos) of things (pragma) 
in the world. In Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning, Deborah K. Modrak 
(2000: 177) explains that, to Aristotle, the logos in the thing was the same logos 
available to the rational mind: “By making the logos (formula) that is asserted by 
the definiens the very same form as the logos that is realized in matter, Aristotle 
hopes to secure the unity of the definition and the intelligibility of the substance”. 
 According to Modrak there is a specific philosophical purpose for the notion 
of the world as an assembly of stable, ontological forms:
Th e ontological requirements of language and knowledge, as Aristotle understands 
them, are such that enduring characteristics of mutable and transient individuals 
are needed. Th is prompts Aristotle to identify forms, in contrast to concrete 
particulars, with primary substance in the central books of the ‘Metaphysics’ and 
to develop an account of the relation between form and matter that is informed at 
every stage by a concern with linguistic defi nition and a conception of essence as 
the exemplary object of knowledge. [...] At every stage, the description of ontology 
is guided by the requirement of rational accessibility. Not only must the ontology 
be intelligible from a theoretical perspective, it must be accessible at the pre-
theoretical level of perception and ordinary language. (Modrak 2000: 175)
Stable, enduring forms and the notion that they are immaculately realized, allows 
the philosophical society to access the world directly and keep the eternal truth 
of the cosmos alive in the fixed code of language. At the later point in European 
history when empirical science is inaugurated as the gateway to true knowledge 
of the world, it is arguably the very same consideration that ultimately causes a 
transformation of the concept of human experience: Dewey writes about how, in 
the times of Plato and Aristotle, the senses of man were thought to relate the world 
to the body: 
Th e senses are connected with the appetites, with wants and desires. Th ey lay 
hold not on the reality of things but on the relation which things have to our 
pleasures and pains, to the satisfaction of wants and the welfare of the body. Th ey 
are important only for the life of the body, which is but a fi xed substratum for a 
higher life. (Dewey 1916: 309) 
But when the body is called to centre stage as the empirical gateway to new truth, 
perception’s connection to individual needs and desires is looked at as a detriment 
(Bordo 1987). Philosophers marred by Cartesian angst were not in search of a less 
determinate and universally true knowledge than the one lost to religious war and 
disturbing cultural, geographical and cosmological discoveries. And so the senses 
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had to be methodically wielded for and controlled (“delivered and reduced”, as 
Francis Bacon4 said) to deliver truth. Dewey (1916: 312) writes that in the 17th and 
18th centuries “[e]xperience lost the practical meaning which it had borne from 
the time of Plato. It ceased to mean ways of doing and being done to, and became 
a name for something intellectual and cognitive. It meant the apprehension of 
material which should ballast and check the exercise of reasoning”. At the same 
time “the interest in experience as a means of basing truth upon objects, upon 
nature, led to looking at the mind as purely receptive. The more passive the mind 
is, the more truly objects will impress themselves upon it” (Dewey 1916: 312).
 The scientific revolution thus established human experience as the passive 
reception and association of objective sense impressions. In other words, the 
philosophers kept the world stable as an atomistic assembly of absolute objects 
with the one hand, while human bodily perception was forced into a diaphanous 
shape by the other. Knowledge, and its containment in the fixed code of language 
was thereby kept safe.
 Later again, prominent thinkers like Kant, Hegel and Darwin each in their 
way destabilized the fixed universe and the direct access to it. The writings of 
Darwin, or of evolutionist thinking in general, were possibly the most disturbing. 
Evolutionists cast the human being as evolved in a struggle to survive in nature, 
and so his abilities would be adapted to serve interaction – not truth. By the end 
of the 19th century adverse feelings towards the classic modern epistemological 
concepts had grown so strong that several seminal philosophical movements 
with defining influence on 20th-century thought and academic culture were 
born from them. The humanist sciences and phenomenology for example are 
respectively spurred by Dilthey’s and Husserl’s initial dissatisfaction with the sterile 
philosophical explanation of experience so remote from actual life (Landgrebe 
1973; Dilthey 1988). The pragmatists, who gathered in a discussion forum they 
called ‘the Metaphysical Club’, were in no way the only ones to turn their backs to 
what Dewey called the philosophical fallacy – the a priori idea that human beings 
are merely spectators of a world to be known.
 And so, in this spirit, new understandings of human perception as somehow 
relative to the human condition present themselves in philosophy and other 
academic fields in the 20th century. Many of the new theories are imbued with 
a longing to reach back behind the relativity to the absolute truth out there. 
Philosophers talk of percepts in the abstract as timeless mental states (Bertrand 
Russell, George E. Moore) and their focus is rather on how these mental states 
relate to truth than to the individual perceiver’s personal needs and purposes. Or 
4 Bacon, Francis 1605. Th e Advancement of Learning, Book II, XIV, 9.
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they describe perceptions beyond individuals, as in species-specific accounts of 
perception (e.g. Jakob von Uexküll, James Gibson) thus safeguarding traditional 
accounts of truth and knowledge. William James’ pragmatic account of human 
experience however presents a radical departure from attempts to fix perception 
beyond the individual perceiver. To James, no worldly forms, neither objective 
nor species-specific, are presupposed when it comes to experience: the forms that 
reality takes, both as regards the perceiver and the perceived, are locally emergent 
in the meeting between world and individual, as both parties have a hand in the 
game:
We conceive a given reality in this way or in that, to suit our purpose, and the 
reality passively submits to the conception.You can take the number 27 as the 
cube of 3, or as the product of 3 and 9, or as 26 plus 1, or 100 minus 73, or in 
countless other ways, of which one will be just as true as another. You can take 
a chess-board as black squares on a white ground, or as white squares on a black 
ground, and neither conception is a false one. 
You can treat the adjoined fi gure [Figure of a ‘Star of David’] as a star, as two 
big triangles crossing each other, as a hexagon with legs set up on its angles, as six 
equal triangles hanging together by their tips, etc. All these treatments are true 
treatments – the sensible that upon the paper resists no one of them. You can say 
of a line that it runs east, or you can say that it runs west, and the line per se accepts 
both descriptions without rebelling at the inconsistency. [...] 
In all these cases we humanly make an addition to some sensible reality, and 
that reality tolerates the addition. All the additions ‘agree’ with the reality; they 
fi t it, while they build it out. No one of them is false. Which may be treated as 
the more true, depends altogether on the human use of it. If the 27 is a number 
of dollars which I fi nd in a drawer where I had left  28, it is 28 minus 1. If it is the 
number of inches in a board which I wish to insert as a shelf into a cupboard 26 
inches wide, it is 26 plus 1. If I wish to ennoble the heavens by the constellations I 
see there, ‘Charles’s Wain’ would be more true than ‘Dipper.’ (James 1907: 251–253)
What shapes the form and meaning of a person’s reality is the practical purpose 
that he holds: 
What shall we call a thing anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out 
everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes. For 
me, this whole ‘audience’ is one thing, which grows now restless, now attentive. I 
have no use at present for its individual units, so I don’t consider them. [...]. Th e 
permanently real things for you are your individual persons. To an anatomist, 
again, those persons are but organisms, and the real things are the organs. Not the 
organs, so much as their constituent cells, say the histologists; not the cells, but 
their molecules, say in turn the chemists.
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We break the fl ux of sensible reality into things, then, at our will. We create the 
subjects of our true as well as of our false propositions. 
We create the predicates also. (James 1907: 253–254)
The reality shaped relative to a person’s purpose in the moment of perception 
carries influence to his practice. James mentions (quoting Wilhelm Ostwald) this 
influence as ‘meaning’: “All realities influence our practice, [...] and that influence 
is their meaning for us” (James 1907: 48).
 Perception to James is an activity which configures (to James, ‘carves out’) 
the world into meaningful forms for the individual perceiver in the moment of 
perception. Perception is an evolved ability to transform an initial indeterminate 
field of impressions (James calls it “pure experience” a “blooming buzzing 
confusion” – James 2003[1912]: 49) into a perceived interaction space in which 
things have taken shape relative to oneself and one’s purpose. Perception thus 
creates a locally specified, tailored, interface between a person and the world which 
facilitates action in pursuit of some purpose. In other words, perception serves and 
informs a person’s ability to act in the world by allowing purpose-relative forms 
and their meanings to emerge.
 The Jamesian account of perception, I suggest, presents itself as a suitable 
candidate for explaining the psychological dynamic in the semiosis of radically 
indeterminate signs. To James, no worldly forms predetermine the form of a 
percept or its meaning, just as no worldly forms or pre-established signs pre-
determine the forms and meanings of the integrational sign. To James, the indi-
vidual perceiver is actively and creatively involved in perception, just as Harris’ 
individual sign-maker is actively and creatively involved in sign-making. To 
James, percepts are made to inform action and to Harris, signs equally inform 
action in that they integrate activities, i.e. they make something mean something 
to someone with regards to a further sequence of activity. In short, I suggest that 
James’ experiential theory can explain the inner dynamics in the sign-making 
process which is currently missing from the integrational account. Sign-making 
happens  – in perception  – when an agent carves out a perceptual form and 
determines its meaning relative to his purpose and situation. 
 Would Harris be sympathetic to granting that a pragmatic theory of experience 
could account for sign-making? The answer may depend on when he would have 
been asked. In 1996, he is arguing against the notion that sign-making happens in 
perception, seemingly wanting to reserve a level of undisturbed pure contact with 
reality as prior to sign-making: 
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[…] what is the diff erence between self-communication and simply being conscious 
of one’s own sensory experience? For the integrationist, all communication in-
volves signs of some kind and signs are what we make them and what we make of 
them. Th ey are not supplied by Nature. Th e diff erence lies there. (Harris 1996a: 
173)
When I dip my toe in the water I simply feel something which is wet and hot, or 
cold or lukewarm, etc,; but these sensations and my judgments as to the wetness, 
heat, etc. require no intermediating sign. Nor do they have any semiological 
function at all until I treat them as signs for purposes of some further activity. 
(Harris 1996a: 177)
Yet this position seems to run counter either to the tenet of the radical indeter-
minacy of the sign, or to an evolutionist rationale. If worldly things forced them-
selves on perception in a particular form and were made into signs in that form, 
then semiotic forms would in fact be predeterminable. If perception would rather 
consistently have to overrule initially perceived particular forms in order to outline 
the shapes that make the world interactable to a purpose-directed person, then 
perception would deliver a terribly ineffective feed to sign-making.    
 Would I be able to quickly figure a pathway through the park if it was made by 
millenia of pebbles each of which became individually present to me first? And 
would I ever see a portrait of a man in the renaissance painting of vegetables by 
Arcimboldo, if all the vegetables first imposed themselves independently on my 
senses? 
 As it happens, in Integrating Reality, a work published in 2012, Harris has let 
go of the commitment to a readymade and preformed human reality that imposes 
itself onto the mind through the senses: “[…] reality does not come equipped with 
its own natural classifications that are then imposed willy-nilly on speakers and 
writers” (Harris 2012: 20–21) and “[…] reality is misconceived when regarded 
as some kind of universal psycho-physical bedrock on which human lives and 
activities ultimately rest” (Harris 2012: 38).
 Harris, in 2012, works with an ontological commitment to reality as a product 
of integration: “integrationism’s main ontological commitment is to language as the 
principal means of integrating reality” (Harris 2012: 111); “what we call ‘reality’ is 
nothing other than its integration in our sensory experiences” (Harris 2012: 21).
 Integration creates reality, and how we perform the act of integration, how we 
from (linguistic or other) impressions provided by our senses create forms and 
meanings in the reality we experience, is not given in advance of who does it or the 
communication situation he or she is in. Integration is done through sign-making 
and signs are radically indeterminate.
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 In this way, to both Harris, writing in 2012, and to James, there is, in the 
creation of experienced reality, a shaping of experienced forms and meaning going 
on relative to the individual human being engaged in a practical activity or by a 
practical purpose. James calls it perception, Harris calls it integration. I stipulate 
that they are talking about the same psychological happening.
 Take Harris’ example of sign-making while driving home one day. He writes: “I 
know, for example that on my way home, by the time I have moved up into third 
gear from the traffic lights by the bridge, it is time to start signalling for my right 
turn by the church on the next corner” (Harris 1996a: 173). To Harris with the 
purpose of reaching home, the action of moving into third gear while accelerating 
after the traffic lights by the bridge is integrated with the act of remembering or 
knowing that it is time to start signalling right. These acts are integrated as Harris 
makes something in his experience a sign, say, for example, that he makes the 
experience of moving into third gear mean that it is time to use the turn signal, 
which he subsequently does.
 Now let us ask Harris to offer the wheel to James, whom we can imagine sitting 
now in the same car on the same road in London driving home, moving up into 
third gear from the traffic lights by the bridge, and knowing that it is time to start 
signalling for his right turn by the church on the next corner. To James, perception 
would involve carving out phenomena as meaningful (influential to) his practice. 
While driving he could for example carve out ‘the move into third gear after the 
traffic lights by the bridge’ as a phenomenon which influences his practice so that 
he remembers to use the turn signal. James could also perceive the phenomenon of 
‘the car accelerating’ as having the influence on his practice to decrease his push at 
the speeder. Of course he could also perceive ‘the wheel’ as a phenomenon which 
allows him to steer the car straight towards the next turn, etc., etc.
 In both accounts meaningful phenomena are given shape in experience, 
relative to purpose. James’ account may remind us that sign-making happens a 
lot more often than what traditional semiologies seem to suggest. But that does 
not retract from the fact that the singular action of making a sign and perceiving 
something as meaningful seems to be the same.
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Creating radically indeterminate form and meaning
In the following section I build on James’ account of experience, extrapolating 
from it when needed in order to inform an integrational account of semiosis.
 Seeing as interaction never happens with one thing in isolation from all 
else, perception would not be efficient if it shaped each thing without regard 
for whatever else is present. Forms jointly serve our interactional purpose. 
The question that perception can implicitly be said to answer when forms and 
meanings arise in an experienced reality thus can not be: ”What form does this 
thing have relative to my kind?” and “What is the interaction potential between 
me and this thing?”. This perceptual idea seems to be presupposed for example in 
the affordance theory of James Gibson.
 How a boy who is climbing up the walls in a hallway, creating leverage by 
pushing his feet against one wall and his hands against the opposite wall, per-
ceptually outlines the particular area further up the wall that – if he moves his 
hand there  – will allow him support to climb again, depends on his current 
position and the perceived features of his body, the length of his arms and the 
strength that he has for example. And how I will understand something you say to 
affect my interaction potential, can, for example, depend on who else is present. 
Perception then must, if we are to keep our understanding of perception in line 
with evolutionary principles, implicitly answer the question: “In which form(s) 
and how does the world affect my interaction potential with the situation I am in?”
 Looking at sign-making as perception, then – perhaps unsurprisingly – tells 
us that the sign is formed relative to our purpose as well as to other factors in the 
situation perceived. The fact that we are not trying to figure out how to interact 
with one thing only, but with a dynamic of things in our surroundings, also tells us 
that we do not see a simple relation between ourselves and the thing we perceive, 
but a relativity between more factors. When we experience a thing, we see how 
it affects our interaction potential with a situation. Thus, meaning does not point 
back to the form, as in binary linear definitions of signs. Meaning is an effect 
on the interaction potential towards some goal or purpose, and as such points 
beyond itself. Harris catches this sense of meaning in the idea of integration: 
“Speech sounds have no meaning unless and until they can be integrated, just like 
other signs, into the process of making sense of some particular episode in the 
continuum of human experience” (Harris, Wolf 1998: 19).
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3. Contextualization and integration 
How do we contextualize a sign? Harris himself called for further investigation of 
this question: 
Contexts are not ‘given’: they are constructed by the participants in particular 
communication situations. How exactly this is done – how the distinctions are 
drawn between what is relevant and what is not  – no one has yet explained. 
Integrational research aims to explore this problem.5 
For certain, contexts are not objectively definable: “[…] context is not some speci-
fic set of background facts which contribute to, or are presupposed by, this or that 
episode of communication” (Harris 1998: 104).
 Contexts are “always the product of contextualization, and each of us con-
textualizes in our own way, taking into account whatever factors seem to us 
to be relevant” (Integrationist notes and papers 2006–2008, here from Pablé, 
Hutton 2015). We may not even be aware exactly how we contextualize: “[…] an 
integrationist would point out that it is far from clear that participants themselves 
always know which particular details or combinations of details in an episode of 
communication led them to interpret it as they did” (Harris 1998: 98).
 When we consider semiosis in the light of James’ pragmatic account of per-
ception, some features of contextualization do seem necessary  – and thus in 
fact pre-determinable – not in content, but in theme, but they are not the more 
traditional ideas of time and place (e.g. Linell 2009) (see below as concerns the 
principle of co-temporality). Rather they are ideas of agency and purpose. In James’ 
description of perception, meaningful things in the world are always carved out 
relative to agent and purpose. It follows that these two percepts must become 
clear before anything else in perception. Accordingly, in an integrational account 
of semiosis we would say that the percepts of agent and purpose are the minimal 
and primary constituents of context.
 Furthermore, if perception is to serve interaction well, it must assure that 
meaningful percepts are adapted  – not only to the interacting agent’s local 
constitution and purpose, but also to any other perceived meaningful factors that 
will affect interaction in the purposed direction. The sign I make from perceiving 
my bike when I look outside needs to be adapted to the fact that I am sick and 
want to go to the doctor as well as to the fact that it is raining. 
5 Harris, Roy. Integrationism, a very brief. introduction. Point 4c. Retrieved from https://
www.royharrisonline.com/integrational_linguistics/integrationism_introduction.html.
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 It may be non-controversial to say that semiosis does not happen without 
an agent. It is important to note, however, that it follows from looking at sign-
making as a perceptual activity that the agent’s purpose is an equally indispensable 
phenomenal factor for effective sign-making.
 You can verify this as easily as by walking up a street. When I, walking down 
the main street in the small town I grew up in, want to go to my parents’ house, 
arriving at the “library square with the fountain on it” can affect my interaction 
potential so as to make me want to turn left down the next side street. As soon 
as I halt my step realizing I left my bag on the train and start considering what 
to do now, I am still in that same spot on the square, but to me the square has 
lost its integrational value. I may configure it again as a point of departure to 
find my direction back to the train station once I set myself a new goal. But the 
semiologically active sign is only to be found in the space between the agent, 
situational phenomena and purpose.
 The claim that sign-making is guided by a practical purpose, which follows 
from regarding sign-making as a perceptual activity, matches Harris’ statement 
that the integration of activities is accomplished by sign-making. To Harris, it 
counts for all communication that: “One activity or complex of activities is to be 
integrated with another in a particular set of circumstances” and “what integration 
there is, in any given circumstances, proceeds by the means of signs” (Harris 
1996a: 12). From a first-person point of view, placed in the midst of action, the 
sign-maker will hardly experience sign-making as an “integration of activities”, 
though. Viewing something as an activity – as a series of movements towards some 
goal – demands distance from the activity itself. Integrating the activity that came 
before with the activity that comes next, may be done reflexively in thought, but 
immersed in the experiencing body during action, what is needed, is that the sign-
maker focus on figuring out the interaction potential ahead, i.e. the sign-maker 
needs to be guided by a purpose, in order to make signs.
 The agentive purpose that constrains contextualization is not necessarily a 
conscious goal. An agent may be aware that he is “folding clothes” while talking 
to a friend on Skype, but the action of folding clothes has a series of subgoals. 
For example, folding a shirt may involve first straightening the fabric with 
smoothing hands and then folding in the sides in straight lines, and then folding 
the top towards the bottom of the shirt. Even if all of these subtasks move the 
agent towards the same goal (of folding the shirt), mixing these tasks up would 
cause inefficient interaction. To gather only the relevant constraints on sign-
making contextualization must employ the right goal in each sign-making act. 
So while the agent may think, and say, that he is folding laundry, the goal that is 
actually constraining his sign-making may be the goal of folding the top of the 
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shirt towards the bottom of the shirt. And as in human life activities are often 
convoluted, concurring or overlapping and even conflicting, an important task of 
the perceiving mind must be to keep track of, organize and manage the goal that 
becomes active when an agent contextualizes signs to guide action.
 Obviously we do not hold very clear goals at all times, and we do manage to 
be in the world when we do not. Are we not sign-making in those situations? I 
reckon that we sometimes have quite broad goals, such as just sitting comfortably. 
In those cases, the seat affecting the way we balance our bodies when holding an 
upright position may be the only sign we make. In cases of meditation we may 
be striving towards making as few signs as at all possible, not moving and not 
thinking. Sign-making integrates activities – in the mind or in the world. 
 During an experience, each meaningful percept I outline – each sign I make – 
by regarding a phenomenon as significant to my interaction potential towards my 
current goal can make part of the context for further perception (sign-making) 
as I move towards my goal. If I first integrate the air to be moved through while 
moving towards the bookshelf to pick up a book, the air and the bookshelf are 
still signs to me as I configure the floor path to walk there. If they were not, I 
would not be able to guide my interaction effectively. Radically indeterminate 
sign-making is thus seen to be in no way random and unguided, but facilitated by 
contextualization, making it a locally constrained operation.
 In short, I suggest that in perception, signs are contextualized as perception first 
outlines an agent and a projected purpose or goal. These two percepts establish a 
minimal understanding of the situation. When the situation is formed, the process 
of sign-making allows the agent to understand a phenomenon as significant to 
his interaction in pursuit of the goal. Once a sign is formed it may take part 
in the contextualization of a new sign. Integration of signs into a consistently 
adjusted context can in this way proceed until the local goal or the perception of 
agency changes. In other words, by perceptually outlining agent and purpose, the 
perceiver establishes the first basis for understanding the world as a constraint to 
his interaction potential. He starts creating reality as a local interface tailored to 
himself and his purpose.
 Contextualization and semiosis are indispensable parts of the same perceptual 
act towards realizing interaction potential in a local pursuit of a purpose: 
“Signification and contextualization are not two independent elements but facets 
of the same creative activity” (Harris 1996a: 164).
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The quality of perceptual signs and contexts
It is important to note that both agency and goal, and phenomena to be inter-
acted with (perceptual forms with meaning) are emergent in the moment of 
contextualization and sign-making as they must be adjusted relative to each other 
in order to aid interaction adequately. Even the idea of the agency that a person 
forms of himself, will ideally be adapted in every new situation so that relevant 
features are drawn forth and irrelevant features are pushed back. The agent can 
perceive himself as part of an agency, a group with a joint purpose, or perceive 
his body as prolonged or extended into an instrument such as a hockey stick or a 
car. The phenomenal factors that go into contextualization and sign-making can 
cut across sensory impressions, memory and imagination. Seeing the top of your 
head when I gaze down to see who is ringing the doorbell, will demand me to use 
memory to establish the whole of you as a sign to affect my further interaction of 
running downstairs to open the door.
 A perceived context is not necessarily tied to local time and space either. Even 
yesteryear’s happenings in Africa that I have only heard of, but remember, can be 
integrated as a sign in my growing understanding of how to interact with a person 
I will meet tomorrow. Harris states that contextualization, like all other aspects of 
communication, is subject to the ‘principle of co-temporality’, which he explains 
as the principle of being “limited by what, at any given time, participants are aware 
of ” (Harris 1998: 105). He writes: “the chronological integration of language with 
events in our daily lives requires us to suppose that what is said is immediately 
relevant to the current situation, unless there is reason to suppose otherwise” (Harris 
1998: 81). 
 However, whenever some situation can be expected to be more salient in the 
mind of the person who is speaking to you, you will contextualize accordingly. If a 
close relative has been in a car accident and you enter home where your wife is in 
the kitchen, it may well be immediately obvious to her when you inquire: “how is 
he?” that you mean your relative rather than the dog who is present in the kitchen 
and usually the subject of concern.
 Only as material beings are we timebound agents. Minds hold no such borders. 
We can travel in possible, projected, imagined, wanted, past worlds, all while 
our bodies remain in the confines of a local moment in a day. The people we 
communicate with can do the same, and we exploit that in communication.
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Mental associations and semiosis
How does the present account of sign-making match the intuitive notion that 
pre-established associations – say, between  language sounds and concepts – play 
an important part in our ability to communicate? Harris does not refrain from 
using the term ‘word’ in his writings. It is clear that he does not think of words in 
a traditional structuralist sense as indivisible ideal units of sound and meaning. 
Rather, words must be thought of as second-order constructions – percepts that 
are decontextualized, abstracted and reified (see Love 2007: 705) from earlier ‘first-
order’ experiences of successful communication. These second-order constructs 
can inform new instances of communication:
[…] what we learn as the names of ‘real’ things embody the views of earlier gene-
rations about the way our language relates to the world. Realia is a collection of 
these hallowed assumptions, which, as learners, we have no way of challenging. 
Nor do we seek to, because these inherited assumptions are eff ective in integrating 
our discourse both with that of our elders and with that of our contemporaries. So 
eventually we lose any sense of their conventionality, and treat them as refl ecting 
the world ‘as it is’ and not as an arbitrary verbal lens through which we have been 
brought up to see things. So if we have learnt to count and to identify pieces 
of furniture, saying ‘Th ere are three chairs in the room’ seems a natural way of 
speaking, objectively dictated by what is really the case, i.e. the presence of three 
chairs in the room. Anyone who checked this by counting the chairs again would 
be sure, barring mistakes of arithmetic, to fi nd the assertion impeccable, provided 
he used words in the same way. (Harris 2012: 15)
Learning to cope in a dynamic world depends on understanding functional 
relations and being able to be guided by this understanding in the experience of 
new situations. This counts for meetings with polar bears as well as in everyday 
situations. Think of a golf player. Experience tells her that a particular direction 
of her feet relative to the flag she is targeting (i.e. placing the feet as pointing 
towards the target) benefits her chance of hitting the target. She may be easily able 
to abstract this association from her memory. The association is not a sign, but a 
generalized abstract idea of a function. As the golf player enters a current game 
and is lining up for her stroke, she can engage the association – i.e. her memory 
of how to position her feet to hit her target – and make a sign from it. This does 
not mean abiding by the recalled association. It means integrating the memory 
into her perception of the situation in which she holds the purpose of finding the 
perfect direction of her feet. In other words she will integrate this memory into 
her contextualization of the sign-making she performs as she outlines the exact 
direction of her feet (form) that will allow her a successful stroke (meaning). She 
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would certainly do well to also include in the contextualization her perception of 
the strength of the wind for example, and of how the terrain (say a group of tall 
trees ahead) will affect the wind at various points of the ball’s travel towards the 
target. All such relevant factors may jointly allow her to make the sign that pointing 
her feet a bit to the right of the target will allow her the effect of hitting the target 
accurately. If she did not integrate all the relevant factors, how sophisticated would 
her interaction be as she strikes? Semiosis is not a simple matter of replicating 
single associations then, but of integrating all and only the relevant factors (from 
memory and present) into a contextualization that adequately informs our sign-
making as we move towards a purpose. The abstracted memory of previously 
made signs can maximally make part of the contextualization of a new sign.
 Similarly, in communication involving language we can observe that sign-
making depends on contextualization and is yet influenced by experience. Imagine 
that I have the purpose of understanding a message from my child left for me 
on the kitchen table. My first subgoal would likely be to read the message, and 
this first involves allowing a visual impression of the print to make me think of 
a sound. My recollection of how I have related my son’s handwritten notations 
to sounds before, are part of my contextualization as I outline the notation 
‘skating’ on the paper and allow it to guide me to think of a specific sound. I 
now change my purpose to that of allowing the sound to make me think of a 
concept and part of my contextualization of this sign-making act is an abstracted 
memory of how I have lately been able to relate sounds to concepts in instances 
of successful communication with my son, so I allow the sound to make me think 
of the activity ‘skateboarding’. I now move on to a new subgoal in my pursuit of 
understanding the message, carrying the purpose of finding out what he wanted 
me to be aware of: as I make a sign from the conceptual thought of skateboarding, 
I may contextualize my sign-making with my interest in knowing where he is, 
with the expectation that he has left the note to let me know something important 
for the coordination of our interaction, with the notion that my son has at this 
time only been back from school for maximum 15 minutes, and with the memory 
that he currently likes to go to the small skatepark close to our house. This 
allows me to make the conceptual thought of skateboarding mean that my son is 
currently at the skatepark. My knowledge of the word ‘skating’ did not determine 
my sign-making and could not have predicted it. In the series of contextualized 
sign-makings that go into moving from just one perceived linguistic expression 
to understood communicated meaning, my semiological actions are guided by 
contextual integrations of abstracted memory but not determined by them.
 The perceptual ability to outline meaningful forms freely in perception makes 
us very creative.  Say I read ‘sk(o:ting’ on the paper from my son instead. Due 
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to my perceptual ability to outline significant forms freely, I can, for example, 
make a sign of the ‘sk..ting’ parts of the writing, supported by integrating the word 
‘skating’ into my contextualization of the sign. The freedom to select form and 
meaning also allows me to understand things in alternative, say metaphorical or 
metonymic ways. If you tell me that your son is a mole in school, I may use the 
word sound to arrive at the concept of a mole but pick out only certain features 
in my thinking about a mole – e.g. that it likes to hide below the surface of the 
earth – and apply them to my imagination of your son in front of teachers. 
 I select a figure in the sensory stimulus or I ‘carve out’, as James says, a pattern 
in the stream of experience to suit my purpose, and then I realize how it affects 
my interaction potential. In language this ability of perception to freely select a 
figure (form or meaning) in the sensory stimuli delivered by a sound or a concept 
is exploited again and again. I increase, reduce or change the initial impression of 
something according to my purpose and other contextualization. Identified with 
the main character in a crime novel, I cannot satisfy my interest in knowing what 
to do next, with the concept of ‘steps’ in the hallway. So in making a sign of this 
concept I expand the idea I construct of what is out there!
 The creation of forms and meanings relative to our purpose and other 
contextualization can explain both why we conduct inferences during language 
comprehension, how linguistic figures arise and how we can create meaning 
out of completely new forms. The perceptual ability to outline significant forms 
freely thus establishes an amazing basis for creative activity. This matches the 
integrational creed “For the integrationist, sign-making is the sole domain of 
unbounded human creativity” (Pablé 2019).
 So the reason we can arrive at the notion that languages exist as fixed codes, is 
that we indeed engage abstracted memories of nomenclatural associations isolated 
from communicatively successful sign-making instances and allow them to guide 
us in local communicative sign-making instances. Only the signs we make by 
reference to these words are indeterminable because they are made in respect 
of other signs that guide the same interaction. We carve out both the significant 
form and its meaning constrained by our contextualization: our purpose, agentive 
capacity and other sign-making.
Conclusion
In this article I have suggested that sign-making can be understood as a funda-
mental part of human perception of the world. Understanding sign-making as 
a natural perceptual capacity seems to me to provide a simple and reasonable 
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evolutionary explanation of this cognitive ability. A question worth pondering is 
perhaps the following: if we did not find sign-making arising in perception, then 
where else would the ability come from?
 I have tried to show that a pragmatic account of experience, such as is pre-
sented by William James, can inform an integrational account of semiosis 
by detailing how we make radically indeterminate signs (i.e. by answering the 
question in which form(s) and how the world affects my interaction with the 
situation I am in), how we contextualize (i.e. by perceptually outlining an agent 
and a goal to be obtained as the minimal understanding of a situation) and how 
we integrate (i.e. by outlining a form relative to our agency and purpose (and other 
already integrated signs) and defining its meaning as an effect on the situational 
interaction potential). 
 I have presented a suggestion to how mental associations become involved as 
tools constrained by the interest in interaction with the world or with others. I 
have suggested that we can solve the riddle of how language can at once be stable 
enough to convey meaning and flexible enough to be indefinitely contextually 
sensitive, lies exactly in realizing that sign-making is involved in linguistic acti-
vity in a different way than we have thought: words are not signs, and do not 
account for the entire path between sign and comprehended language meaning. 
Signs are at once more plentiful, flexible and interdependent in communication 
activity than we have thought – captive, as we may have been held, by the idea of 
communication as fixed code transfer of thought.6
References
Bordo, Susan R. 1987. The Flight to Objectivity. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Cobley, Paul 2011. Mythbusting. Language Sciences 33(4): 511–516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
langsci.2011.04.006
Cunningham, Suzanne 1996. Philosophy and the Darwinian Legacy. Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press.
Dewey, John 1916. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. 
New York: The Macmillan Company.
Dilthey, Wilhelm 1988. Introduction to the Human Sciences: An Attempt to Lay a Foundation 
for the Study of Society and History. (Betanzos, Ramon J., trans.) Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press 
Harris, Roy 1981. The Language Myth. London: Duckworth.
Harris, Roy 1996a. Signs, Language, and Communication. New York: Routledge.
6 Acknowledgements. Th e author wishes to thank Adrian Pablé for most helpful comments to 
this article.
30 Charlotte Conrad
Harris, Roy 1996b. The Language Connection: Philosophy and Linguistics. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic.
Harris, Roy 1998. Introduction to Integrational Linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon.
Harris, Roy 2009. The integrational conception of the sign. In: Harris, Roy, Integrationist Notes 
and Papers 2006–2008. Gamlingay: Bright Pen, 61–81.
Harris, Roy 2012. Integrating Reality. London: New Generation Publishing.
Harris, Roy; Wolf, George (eds.) 1998. Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader. Oxford: 
Pergamon.
James, William 1907. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co.
James, William  2003[1912]. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Courier Dover Publi-
cations.
Landgrebe, Ludwig 1973. The phenomenological concept of experience. (Welton, Donn C., 
trans.) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34(1): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.2307/ 
2106776
Linell, Per 2009. Rethinking language, mind and world dialogically: Interactional and con-
textual theories of human sense-making. Charlotte: Information Age Publishing.
Love, Nigel 2007. Are languages digital codes? Language Sciences 29: 690–709. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.langsci.2007.01.008
Modrak, Deborah 2000. Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Noë, Alva 2004. Action in Perception. London: The MIT Press.
Pablé, Adrian 2019. Integrating the (dialogical) sign: Or who’s an integrationist? Language 
Sciences 75: 72–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2019.06.001
Pablé, Adrian; Hutton, Christopher 2015. Signs, Meaning and Experience: Integrational 
Approaches to Linguistics and Semiotics. (Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 15.) 
Berlin: De Gruyter.
Popper, Karl 1963. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge.
Varela, Francisco J.; Thompson, Evan; Rosch, Eleanor 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Создание реальности в виде локального интерфейса – 
интеграционный, прагматичный подход к семиозису
Лингвистика и семиотика традиционно отстаивают мнение, что коммуникация пред-
полагает знаки. Интеграционная лингвистика бросает вызов этой точке зрения, опро-
вергая онтологический статус знаков и семиотических кодов первого порядка. Однако 
если коммуникация не зависит от заранее установленных знаков, то каким образом 
происходит семиозис? И что лежит в основе интуитивно приемлемого представления 
о том, что коды существуют как социально переносимые структуры среди живых 
существ?
 В статье предлагается интеграционный подход к семиозису, основанный на пред-
положении, что производство знаков является перцептивной деятельностью. Я 
опи раюсь на концепцию человеческого опыта Уильяма Джеймса при разъяснении 
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утверждений Роя Харриса о радикальной неопределенности, контекстуальности и 
процессе интеграции знака. В заключение рассматривается роль ментальных ассо-
циаций в коммуникативной деятельности, в частности ассоциаций между звуками 
языка и понятиями.
Reaalsuse loomine lokaalselt kujundatud liidesena – 
semioosi integratsiooniline, pragmaatiline selgitus 
Lingvistika ja semiootika on traditsiooniliselt toetanud seisukohta, et kommunikatsiooni 
eel duseks on märgid. Integratsiooniline lingvistika vaidlustab selle seisukoha, kummutades 
märkide ja semioloogiliste koodide esimese astme ontoloogilise staatuse. Ent kui kommuni-
katsioon ei sõltu eelnevalt sätestatud märkidest, siis kuidas toimub semioos? Ja mis on aluseks 
intuitiivselt omaksvõetavale arusaamale, et koodid eksisteerivad elusolendite seas sotsiaalselt 
kantud struktuuridena?
 Esitan artiklis integratsioonilise ülevaate semioosist, mis põhineb oletusel, et märgiloome 
on pertseptuaalne tegevus. Lähtun William Jamesi inimkogemuse mõistest, selgitamaks Roy 
Harrise väiteid märgi radikaalse määramatuse, kontekstualiseerituse ning integratsiooniprotsessi 
kohta. Lõpetuseks vaatlen, millist rolli mängivad kommunikatsioonitegevuses mentaalsed 
assotsiatsioonid, näiteks need, mis esinevad keelehelide ja mõistete vahel.
